Ethics in Tangents: Part 3 - Ayodhya Dispute and Claims from Faith

In this post I very briefly discuss the Ayodhya dispute, and using points of departure from it, try to point out the inferences that could be drawn. These inferences fall largely in the domain of ethics. Note here that I am not saying I am drawing these inferences, but that they could be drawn, and will rather try to show that the way ethics in our World are perceived and had perhaps traditionally been practiced in the past, there are many inconsistencies in their application. Readers are obviously encouraged to give their feedback, for I lay no claim to perfection in the logic I use (especially so in this blog post) as I deal with something so contentious that the Indian Judiciary has not been able to come up with a verdict on the 'ownership' of the land despite little paucity of, or for that matter, even need for evidence. In the process, I rely upon two major assumptions (kindly note the emphasis). The first one being that a temple devoted to Ram had actually existed in Ayodhya at the disputed site, and second, that journalist-writer, Dilip D'Souza (click) has paraphrased quite faithfully L. K. Advani's (and the BJP's) stance when he states the following in his article - Memories of resolution and resolve (click):

1. "...how could the courts rule on this matter of faith, they (BJP) asked righteously"
2. "For a man (Atal Behari Vajpayee) who resolved with his party -- then not in office, OK -- that the dispute could not be resolved in the courts, this is a complete and abject turnabout."
3. "Seeing hope now in the courts is as frankly silly as when Advani shouted hoarsely from his Toyota that no court on earth could decide this matter of faith"

So, from above three sentences used by Dilip, one could conclude that the BJP and especially so, Advani had asserted that: matters of faith cannot be decided by courts of law. Elsewhere in the same article, he is quoted to have provided both legislation or out-of-court settlement between the two religious communities as viable alternatives to break through the impasse.

The reasons I make the above assumptions are because they seem reasonable ones to make, and that there is little reason to be skeptical about them. Though I must point out that the first assumption has been contested. This contention, and the sequence of important events and their historical background could be found in two Wikipedia articles - Babri Mosque (click) and Ayodhya Debate (click), which I have incidentally used as my primary sources of information. This dispute is sourced in the 16^th century, much, much before I was born. As is usually the case, history is rarely chronicled reliably, which is of special significance in the given issue. Moreover, I am not a professional historian, nor a journalist to have kept tabs on all the major events. Lastly, I was quite young when the Babri Mosque was demolished in 1992, of which I remember little. So obviously, my knowledge and understanding of the issue cannot be taken as an authoritative one, still I have formed opinions on it, which are in flux, and yet I venture out to publicize them for two reasons. One, there is hardly any subject on which the 'final word' is ever spoken. Meaning, we always come across new pieces of information that alter our opinions, or new arguments to shift our positions. So in most areas of life, we form opinions or reach decisions despite possessing knowledge and understanding that could be assessed as only far from complete, so why not on this one? Two, as I am not a stakeholder of the disputed site, nor an influential person insofar as my opinion can have a bearing on the final outcome of verdict to be announced on the 28^th of this month, I believe, there is no harm in coming out with it (my take).

In very brief, I discuss the timeline of Ayodhya dispute, as I understand it:

1. 1558: 'Mir Banki' - a General of Babar, the Mughal ruler, destroys the Ram Temple.
2. 1850s: In the interim, both Hindus and Muslims used to worship at the site. However, there were clashes between the two communities in 1850s, and the British had built a fence around the main structure. Hindus were not allowed entrance, and they used to offer prayers on a raised platform. The festival of Ram Navmi (which marks the birth of Ram) was also celebrated by the Hindus at the site for at least since over a century.
3. 1883-86: Few representations were made by Hindus seeking permission to build a Temple on the raised platform, which were rejected by the British Judges.
4. 1934: There were some religious clashes between Hindus and Muslims, the Mosque was damaged, which was made good by the British.
5. 1936: Within the provisions of an act passed in 1936, the Mosque and the surrounding area were recognized to be owned by the 'UP Waqf Board'
6. 1949: Gradually, as claimed by Hindus, Muslim interest in the site had waned and by 1947, they had stopped offering Namaaz there. Moreover, the government had disallowed Muslims to enter within 200 m of the site. Only Hindus were allowed to enter, but that too through a side-door. [Here though, I must point out that if Muslims were anyway not offering prayers there, why would there be a need to make the site out-of-bounds for them? So, something is not making definite sense to me, but as I mentioned above, some of the details of events and reasons behind them remain unclear.]
7. 1949: Idols of Ram and Sita were sneaked into the Mosque at night. This was reported by the police, when discovered. The following morning a large mob of Ram devotees had tried to enter the Mosque, but which was prevented from doing so. At this point, the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru on learning of the incident had ordered removal of the two idols from the temple. Significantly, a Waqf Inspector at around that time had complained that Hindus would jeer at Muslims entering and exiting the Mosque for offering Namaaz (something that contradicts the claim that Muslims were not using the Mosque).
8. 1984: Though Hindus had since long been interested in the reclamation of the site and restoration of the Temple, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad revived this demand more vocally and had resolved to build a Temple devoted to the infant Ram at the site.
9. 1985: Rajiv Gandhi government had passed a resolution to have the main locks of the Mosque opened for Hindus, the Allahabad High Court also ordered the same in 1989.
10. 1989: In November (prior to General Election), the VHP had obtained permission (from whom? - that is unclear) to perform Shilanyas ("stone laying ceremony") at the site. This had sparked Muslim unease and protests.
11. 1992: December 6 - the Babri Mosque was demolished, in which prominent leaders of the BJP, like L. K. Advani have been implicated to have played a provocative role by the Liberhan Commission instituted by the then Congress government.
12. There are claims that during excavation remnants suggesting existence of Jain or Buddhist architecture were also found. However, I do not know if these claims are verified, and that in which stratum of the soil were these remains found - that is what would eventually determine what was the first place of worship built at the disputed site.

As is the case with complicated problems, let me try to bring in an analogy, which I hope would simplify the considerations involved.

There are two neighbors - 'A' and 'B'. 'A' owns a board game, which is his major source of entertainment. 'B' is a much more powerful person, and for some reasons, snatches away the game kit from 'A'. Moreover, 'B' does not have much use for the game kit as he does not enjoy board games much. Whether 'A' had protested or not is not clearly known, though he would have, as can be thought of as natural with any kind of extortion. At the same time, the B-family erases the preexisting design on the board, and replaces it with one that would make it conducive to a set of rules different from the one by which the A-family plays. Significantly, they also remove a few squares from the board that are most vital to the A-family's set of rules of game-play. Now, 'B' 'bequeaths' the game kit to his son, who in turn bequeaths it to his son, and henceforth. Now, the game kit ends up with one of the descendants of 'B'. Just like 'B', 'b' also does not find that particular board game too interesting. Correspondingly, the contemporary of 'b' is 'a', who is a descendant of 'A'. All through the course of time, certain indeterminate (but perhaps, large) fraction of the descendants of 'A' very much want the game kit to be theirs, and are opposed to its possession by the B-family, which the A-family members feel is illegal. The reason protesting A-members cannot seek legal redress is because the B-family also happens to be the village head, who sits in judgment of all such disputes! Then, the village head changes. This time it is 'J'. Again, members of the A-family demand that the game kit be returned to them, but the new village head tells them that "as the incident of snatching away the game kit was too old, nothing could be done about it". Now, the new village head recognizes the A-family's need for entertainment and thus takes a view more sympathetic than had been taken by the B-family, and asks that the A-family be allowed to use certain section of the board, but still leaves its possession with the B-family, and in fact legitimatizes such possession of the board by B-family using a new provision of law. Moreover, the new judge does not allow restoration of board's original structure as otherwise the game kit would be rendered useless for the B-family, which would amount to injustice, because the new Judge deems the B-family to be the rightful owner. Then, again the judge changes to 'j' [please note here that 'j' follows most of the laws 'J' had defined and also does not recognize himself as truly distinct from 'J' by way of honoring the precedents set by 'J' and also by recognizing the records of ownership maintained by 'J'] . By now, the A-family becomes much more powerful than the B-family. Some of the A-family members forcibly insert the missing squares so that the board would become fully functional for the manner in which they want to play their game. However, 'j' intervenes, and has those squares removed. But 'j' also disallows the B-family from using the board, though its 'possession' remains with the B-family itself. Ultimately, 'j' allows A-family to use the entire board, but without allowing re-insertion of the squares nor allowing any kind of redrawing. Also, some of the A-family descendants want to make the board look more beautiful, of course which is denied by 'j'. Concurrently, the B-family was offered another board to design its game on, which was rejected by those members of the B-family that were deemed as the both the representatives of the B-family and also as 'owners' of the original board by both 'J' and 'j'. So one of these days, few of the A-family members completely erase the designs drawn by the B-family. The B-family vehemently protests this. This act by the A-family is seen widely as illegal, because the erasure of the design did not have the sanction of 'j'. Another reason it is critiqued is is because the B-family protests the act and sees it as bullying. Later, some sketchy evidence emerges that even before the board was owned by A-family, it was owned by the 'C'-family!

Well, I have laid the analogy above. Obviously, being an analogy, there are bound to be significant incongruities between it and the 'real' situation. Significant among them being:

1. In the analogy, the warring parties are well-recognized individuals with unambiguous property rights to begin with as far as the ownership of the game kit are concerned. Whereas, this is not the case with the disputed land. Though, it seems in 1936, the British 'invented' the ownership of the site by awarding it to the 'Waqf' board or in other words, awarding it to the Muslim community, thus granting a status of a syndicate
2. The emotional attachment aspect of both the communities towards their respective structures (whatever be its degree or justifiability) has been overlooked. But this because, I believe, justice should not be based on emotional attachment.
3. The motives of the A- and the B-families in wanting to hold on to the board have again not been figured. This is similar to the second point above, meaning, what one plans to do with what one possesses is not an index to whether that person is the 'rightful' owner or not.

I again encourage the reader to point out other significant departures in the analogy from the real thing.

Now, let us analyze the entire dispute over the game kit more closely. At the heart of the entire issue is one of 'ownership' - the idea that a board can be owned by a person or group of persons, who reserve the right of what could be done to that board, what could be done with that board, and most important, who else to allow or to disallow from using it, and what kind of uses to allow/disallow.

Let me start with a 'sub-analogy' (that is, an analogy within an analogy): Suppose, 1 steals a watch from 0, and then gives it to 2. Can we now consider 2 to be the rightful owner of the watch? Would we consider 0's demand legitimate that the watch be returned back to him?

I am guessing, most would answer that in 'no' and 'yes' respectively. The reason behind our answer would be that:

"To have the legitimate right to transfer the ownership of something one must own it in manner that is considered legitimate in the first place."

... [a.1]

But let us slightly complicate the sub-analogy above: what if 2, instead of keeping the watch for himself, transfers it to 3, who transfers it to 4, and who to 5. Would 0 still have the right to claim the watch as his own? Would 5 be considered the rightful owner of the watch?

I guess, many would still respond that the watch be rightly restored to 0, and that 5 cannot claim any ownership of the watch, because just like how transfer of watch from 1 to 2 would be not recognized as legitimate, that of 2 to 3, 3 to 4 and 4 to 5 would also not be recognized as legitimate. This leads us to yet another assertion:

"The illegitimacy of transfer of ownership is independent of the number of hands the property passes from 'under'. In other words, a series of transfers of ownership does not make legitimate the final transfer, if the first transfer of ownership was illegitimate (stealing, for instance)."

... [a.2]

So, using the above two points and applying them to the original analogy of game board, one would assume that 'b' never really was in its possession, as the first acquisition of the board itself was by an illegitimate method (extortion). This, because A had never willingly handed over the game board to B. So can we say that 'A' was the rightful owner of the game board, and by extension, so is 'a'? And as corollary, 'b' is not the rightful owner of the board?

It might be tempting to answer the above as 'yes' and 'yes', but let me try to explain the complications involved.

The answer in affirmative would depend on our assuming that the forceful acquisition of the board was illegitimate. The reason I say this amounts to an assumption and not some kind of verifiable, absolute truth is because, the said extortion seems illegitimate from the perspective of current code of ethics and the penal law we follow! And we cannot use the legal system of our times to impose the conclusions that follow on an entirely different system of justice (that must have existed when 'B' took away the board from 'A'). And it can also be safely assumed that the system of justice that prevailed when 'B' took away the board from 'A' did not find the act illegitimate, otherwise the ownership of the game board would have been restored to the original owner 'A'. Some might point out that the justice system back then must have not existed, or that it was undemocratic, barbaric, etc. But while trying to assess whether the transfer of ownership by 'B' to his son 'b' was illegitimate or not, we need to prove that the method by which 'B' had acquired it from 'A' was illegitimate exactly at the time when it was being acquired! Let me veer off into another small example. Let us assume there was a time when spitting on the roads was not illegal, and then a few years later when spitting was made punishable someone brings to a court's notice a video clip of a person spitting on road. Would we then apply the current set of rule to an act (and punish the spitting person) when different set of rules had existed, and under which spitting was not illegal? I guess, most would say that the spitting person cannot be punished. So, applying similar logic, if the system that existed during the extortion of game board did not find such acquisition illegal, then all the subsequent transfers that led 'b' to ultimately come in possession of the game board would also be legal. So, I submit that:

"The legitimacy or illegitimacy of an act are determined by the code of ethics and law that had prevailed and to which the concerned parties ('aggressor' and 'victim') were subjected. And the said legitimacy versus illegitimacy cannot be determined retrospectively using the current system of law and ethics."

... [b.1]

Now let me bring in another complicating factor. If someday using points a.1 and a.2, Red Indians in the USA appeal to the people of other ethnicities to leave their continents as they were the rightful owner of everything that existed in there and that each and every instance of acquisition of any kind of property was forceful and thus illegitimate, and so were the subsequent transfers, what would our response be? Would we be able to 'do justice' to their demand? I guess, most would be in an ethical dilemma at this question. What would justify the retention of status quo, that is, keeping the property with current owners and thus rejecting the claim of the Red Indians? [Here, I am not getting into distracting details like whether 'pure breed' Red Indians still exist or not; the question is purely hypothetical]. What would again prevent us from transferring back all the property rights to the Red Indians would partly be the reason b.1, but apart from that the fact that on analysis of many such historical cases of acquisition, it seems that the aggressor becomes the rightful owner of something if the original owner stops complaining or is put in such position by the aggressor that the victim cannot complain (say, by actually killing or threatening to harm). From citing of these instances, one could conclude that:

"If acquisition of a property is forceful, and if the new ownership is maintained for long enough so that the original owner is in no position to complain/protest or stops complaining/protesting, then even most current systems of law and ethics recognize the aggressor as the rightful owner and the original owner is thought to have been validly dispossessed of his property."

... [b.2]

Though, b.2 seems barbaric and quite at odds with our current world view, the fact is, for practical concerns, we are forced to take that position. And no, I won't even go into the perhaps-by-now-debunked 'Aryan invasion theory' and how all the 'Aryans' - whoever they may be - and the exhortation that they leave the Indian subcontinent to the native people - whoever they may be! ;) So, from the above two arguments (b.1 and b.2) it seems that the game board could be entirely turned over to the B-family. Please note that though there are exactly two reasons each to restore the board to A-family or alternatively, to maintain the status quo by entirely transferring the ownership to B-family, the b-points (that is, those that support B-family's ownership) supersede the a-points in their applicability. So, we can conclude here that B-family should be the rightful owner of the game board, provided it could be proved that B-family had completely decimated the A-family or had threatened the A-family sufficiently into conceding its ownership. But that is something that as of now remains indeterminate and the decision in that regard would depend on the evidence of such complaints/protests provided by the A-family.

But, but, but... every time the system of ethics and justice changes (which would usually happen with the change in the ruler), it automatically takes it upon itself to make null and void all the previously established norms of ownership and its transfer. This also enables the new regime to set new norms of ownership and also allows it to nullify the existing ownerships. It is precisely this mechanism that had allowed the justice system that had existed at the time when 'B' had forcefully acquired the game board from 'A' to do so. In simple words, the moment 'B'-family started applying its justice system (by virtue of being the village head). It had assumed the power to dissolve the previous norms of ownership and also the specific instances of ownership (e.g., the A-family's ownership of the board). Because had it not nullified the preexisting norm as well as the status of ownership, it would have never allowed 'B' to take ownership of the board. It is not difficult to see that the guiding philosophy of that justice system was sadism - of gaining pleasure through troubling the A-family and asserting B-family's supremacy over the A-family. Whether this goal was noble or ignoble or moral or otherwise is not the concern. But that the new justice system started reevaluating the individual instances of ownership based on its own goals and the ideals it envisaged.

"Each time a new system of justice and ethics takes over, going by the historical precedents, it has the right to consider null and void all existing claims of ownership. Moreover, the new system will try to take decisions based on its fundamental philosophy and the goals the regime it serves seeks to achieve."

... [c.1]

Above point c.1 sounds contradictory to b.2, but there is a subtle difference. b.2 says that we cannot call some act illegitimate using current standards if at the time of commission of that act it was not recognized as illegitimate. Whereas, c.1 legitimatizes the rights of a new justice system to consider null and void all instances of preexisting ownership, irrespective of whether those instances of ownership were considered legitimate or not. In fact, it is the same logic that had also allowed 'J' to further legitimatize B-family's ownership of the board in face of continual protests by the A-family and its attempts to take back the possession of the board.

"Same considerations would apply to the struggle of ownership between the C-family and the A-family. Original and rightful owner of the board could be considered to be the C-family (instead of the A- or the B-family) if it could be proved that they had also continuously protested the forceful taking over of the board by A-family just like A-family (seemingly) had protested such taking over by the B-family."

... [C.2]

Here, one more thing that needs to be considered is that by virtue of the fact that 'j' is a descendant of 'J', and in fact considers his own justice system and that of 'J' to be one continuum, it also gives 'j' the power to review and overturn the decisions taken by 'J'.

A small note: I had done all the above analysis, and drafted most of it independently using my understanding of ethics, law, concepts of ownership, human behavior and history. However a few days earlier, I had come across the concept of 'adverse possession' (click). Its concept is very similar to the point b.2 above. Wikipedia defines the concept as:

"Adverse possession is a process by which premises can change ownership. It is a common law concept concerning the title to real property (land and the fixed structures built upon it). By adverse possession, title to another's real property can be acquired without compensation, by holding the property in a manner that conflicts with the true owner's rights for a specified period."

The same Wikipedia article further gives the minimum criteria that must be fulfilled for the disseisor (the aggressor who seeks to supplant the original claim to ownership) to become the new rightful owner:

1. Actual possession of the property - The disseisor must 'use' the new property.
2. Open and notorious use of the property - Use of the property must not be covert, and the original owner must be aware of such use by the disseisor.
3. Exclusive use of the property - The disseisor must exclude others (including the original owner) from using the property. This would be seen as the disseisor claiming ownership of the property.
4. Hostile or adverse use of the property - The disseisor has to occupy and use the property in a manner that is protested or disapproved of by the original owner.
5. Continuous use of the property - The disseisor must use the property continuously from the time of taking over its possession to the point in time when the matter is brought under consideration.

Though, the Wikipedia does not mention it in the list of minimum criteria, it talks of two similar premises, on which the concept of adverse possession is based - the doctrine of laches (that the original owner, if not making claim to his adversely possessed property in timely manner is seen to have lost the claim) and statute of limitations (the time within which a crime has to be reported, otherwise the court would not take it up for hearing).

I have no idea of the sections of property acts in India that deal with adverse possession, and it also needs to be pointed out that the Wikipedia article is largely based on the US justice system, and the provisions there could be somewhat different. Moreover, I read that this provision that is seen to be sympathetic towards a hostile trespassers and unjust to the original owners is falling out of favor. The only reason I had brought up this concept was because it adds another angle to the legal aspects of the problem.

So, now applying all the above conclusions that were drawn from above premises, analogies and examples to the situation at hand, i.e., the Ayodhya dispute, we can conclude that what needs to be done would be largely based on the discretion of the present Indian Judiciary, because based on precedents set, it has the right to consider null and void all the titles of ownership that had existed before its establishment. Moreover, it is also within its power to review the decision by the British government of recognizing the ownership of the 'UP Waqf Board', more specifically whether such recognition falls in line with the founding principles of the Indian Constitution. Also inadvertently, the Indian Judiciary would be passing a judgment on what it thinks of the acts of Babar's general - Mir Banki - that is, whether it approves of the manner of acquisition of property by way of not reversing such possession despite having the right to do so. Please note that in the conclusions that I have derived, [a] series stands for arguments that support restoration of the disputed site to the (representatives of) Hindus, [b] series stands for complete restoration of the disputed site to the (representatives of) Muslims, and [c] series stands for arguments that lead to outcomes based largely on discretion.

I also need to point out here that, irrespective of whether the Court hands over the title deed of the disputed land to (representatives of) 'Hindus' or not, the act of Babri Mosque demolition would be deemed a crime as at the time of demolition, no one was authorized to demolish it.

Also, as I mentioned further what further complicates the matters is, though the majority of Indians view the Babri issue as a struggle between the Hindu and the Muslim communities, the fact is that the courts do not recognize an owner-entity called 'Hindu community' or 'Muslim community'.

Now, returning to Mr. Advani's assertion that matters of faith cannot be decided by courts of law, I would just like to ask, then what is all that precedes? Of course, I am no expert in law, nor of philosophy/ethics. But despite my limited knowledge and understanding, I have tried to resolve the larger issue into its individual attendant smaller issues. The claim from faith is one of the most horrible one. It seeks to spit in the face of one ability that separates humans from other animals - that of observing, questioning, thinking and answering. This intelligence is what separates humans from other species. An out-of-court settlement though seems a good solution as it might, in opinion of few, prevent lot of violence and blood shed, but in reality, it might be an unethical way of dealing with things also. Meaning, who would negotiate, and on what basis would we be able to determine who they represent? What if the 'UP Sunni Waqf Board' does not represent the views/aspirations of all/majority of Muslims? Or alternatively, is 'The Ram Janmabhoomi Nyas' truly representative of all Hindus' views/aspirations? Also, a legislative action would not be appropriate as the legislature is not trained nor qualified to weigh the various evidences available. So, whatever be the dispute, faith, which is antithetical to human capacity to reason cannot be invoked for resolution.

Synopsis:

I hope that I have been able to highlight the major ethical considerations in my analysis. It is easy to confuse that I was trying to deal with the legal aspects of the problem, because law is very much based on ethics. However, I have studiously avoided dealing with legal issues, because I am not an expert, I do not have all the evidence at my disposal, and also because, in some areas law might not coincide with what is most pragmatic or what could be perceived as most ethical.

One of the most important problems I wanted to highlight was that as the human race has progressed ahead, somehow, perhaps because of lesser scarcity of resources for basic survival, frequency of armed conflicts has drastically come down. Some might wish to disagree, but it must be noted that this shift can be gauged from the fact in quite a few discussions, violence is seen as reprehensible and it is accepted that it should be used as the last resort. [I do not know how it used to be in the past, but it seems mass murderers were celebrated as 'conquerors' and 'successful' kings, etc. It also seems that in the past, high premium was laid on physical strength and the ability to inflict wounds and kill. But such people are not usually celebrated in the civil society]. What this shift in public opinion, which tilts towards universal human rights, has done is that violent means of acquiring property are outlawed and are severely criticized in the public. This has reduced the number of instances of such forceful acquisitions. But when we look back in history, such forceful acquisitions were considered quite legitimate, and in fact were even celebrated. So, when we try to determine the legitimacy of current ownerships that were at behest of such coercion, we are faced with an ethical dilemma. Can such properties that were acquired by the ancestors of current owners through force (illegally bu current standards) be considered legal/legitimate/ethical. This confusion arises, because one of the important caveats in application of both ethics and law is consistency, meaning that two similar/identical acts carried out in exactly same circumstances but involving different people at different time and place should be considered similarly/identically legal/legitimate/ethical or otherwise.

So, the question is: what point in time shall we set before which the forceful acquisition of any property that would have occurred should be considered legitimate and whatever would occur later than that would be considered illegitimate?

Disclaimer:

1. I am not an expert at law. This analysis is an outcome of my crude understanding of various issues involved. Also, it was not keeping in view the technicalities of law and the need for evidence (e.g., whether a Temple devoted to Ram existed at the disputed site and whether what was demolished in 1992 was indeed a Mosque going by the legal definition of a Mosque), but rather my crude understanding of ethics, on which legal system of almost all democratic and liberal countries are based.
2. Many have argued that the site should be taken over by the government (using the Constitutional provision equivalent to that of 'eminent domain') and used for larger good of the public. I very strongly opposed to this idea. Because, this view would then allow for sadistic elements in the society to dispossess others of their legitimately owned property simply by disputing its ownership fully knowing that others would urge the property's taking over by the Indian State. E.g., if I break the glasses of a pub at a disputed site, can then others urge that instead of trying to establish its genuine ownership using evidence available and the provisions of law, that the government take it over and convert it into a hospital for larger good of the society because nobody needs a pub anyway?

PS: A good article I had come across explaining the basic issues considered by the Allahabad High Court could be found here - The Ayodhya Anatomy (click) by The Telegraph (Calcutta).

Ethics in Tangents: Part 1 - Lessons on Inequity of Risks and Benefits

In a lecture on radiation safety, the teacher had veered a bit into the ethics of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He explained that it has to be ensured that those working at nuclear establishments for larger good of the society (e.g., energy production, diagnosis & treatment in medicine) despite facing risks to health & life, must be adequately compensated as not all the benefits that arise off their work go to those working. A logic similar in line has been laid out by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (IRCP) [click] in their (PDF) document on their History, Policies, Principles (click to download):

For equity reasons (because those who are exposed are not necessarily those who gain by a practice) some dose or risk limitation is necessary to prevent the optimised situation from being one where a few individuals receive inappropriately high doses.

It was agreed between the teacher and the students that that compensation to the workers is in the form of the salary they draw. But that got me thinking: is that really so, more so in the government-controlled nuclear establishments in India? Do those working at high-risk places get higher pay as compared to those doing the same work in low-risk environments? Does for instance, an office clerk working in precincts of a nuclear establishment draw a larger salary than one working in a college administrative office? Answer, as of now is “no”. Why is that so?

My above thoughts were tangential to what was being discussed in the class (though, I would return to them later). The teacher went on to assert that if nuclear establishment worker gets monetarily compensated for the risk he/she takes, then the converse must also hold true, i.e., all those who derive benefit from existence of such establishments must face a non-zero quantum of risk. Well, that made perfect sense to me. And that is how he justified the risks posed to the general public by the operation of facilities with radioinuclides [click] (those forms of elements that emit ionizing radiation, which have potential for health hazards). As an aside, I came across this (click) blog post, which explains how risks posed by waste routinely generated from nuclear power plants have been overestimated by many [note: the article does not cite many sources, moreover, it does not cover risks posed by nuclear accidents, but to the best of my knowledge is quite correct].

Later, the teacher also explained how the principle of ALARA (click) - As Low As Reasonably Achievable that the ICRP uses for (radiation) dose-optimization has a flaw. Why what risk (radiation dose) I find reasonable for the benefits I derive, should also be reasonable to my neighbor? What alternative does one who applies most stringent threshold for radiation exposure have if the majority in an area consent to a higher dose? This led me to think about the representative form of governance. It allows a small number of people to take decisions on behalf of a very large number of people who ironically would be influenced much greatly by such decisions. So possibly, not just a minority, but even the majority in a constituency could be opposed to construction and operation of nuclear establishment in their vicinity, and yet the government (small number of individuals) would have the legitimate authority to overrule such a wish. But this ethical predicament is taken care of by the assumption that the electorate would choose with greatest conviction (and hence, numbers) a person they trust the most to take decisions in their best interest. This was just an offshoot of thoughts in my mind, and I would not like to comment any further on this aspect of representative form of democracy.

Returning to one of the original predicaments: why would a clerk working for a nuclear establishment in India not be paid more than another clerk working in an administrative office of a college despite the former facing a greater risk to health and life? It is not difficult to answer – unemployment. Of course, there could be other reasons too for the said clerk not demanding a higher pay, e.g., ignorance of the risks posed by working there. But yet, I believe the biggest reason is unemployment. The state of employment market, even in government sector, whether we realize or not, is greatly influenced by demand-supply factors. The said clerk does not have any bargaining power. The moment he would say, “I want higher pay for the additional risk I would be facing”, the government would tell, “fuck off! Next!”. So obviously, our clerk is not going to make such a plea. Because he would know that there are many people with his kind of abilities seeking livelihood. If not him, someone else would take his place. This brings us to a somewhat intuitively obvious inference – the money that can be earned from doing a job is a function of:

1. Number of people wanting a job done. Greater the demand for a job, greater would be the pay.

2. Number of people willing to do that job. More the number of people willing to do the job, greater would be the bargaining power of those wanting the job done. Thus lesser would be the amount paid.

3. Number of people capable of doing that job. Greater the skill/training/experience a particular job requires, fewer would be the people capable of doing that job.

While, I had been vaguely aware of above factors, I was made to think more about them during one of my train journeys from Delhi to Mumbai. I had a very heavy luggage with me, mostly consisting of books - could have exceeded 100 kg. Whatever be the exact weight, I had to engage a porter to carry my luggage to the platform. I had another friend with me, and what the porters had demanded was exorbitant amount – to the tune of Rs. 800 for all the luggage. Seeing the weight of luggage, I was alright with that amount, but my friend was not. So, we engaged only two porters instead of three or four that would have been required. The arrangement obviously required us to carry quite a bit of luggage ourselves – covering a distance of about 300 m. By the time we had accomplished the task we were totally exhausted, and needless to say, a few of our muscles must have got pulled. But for me, the ordeal was not over yet! My train was scheduled to depart a couple of hours after my friend's – and from a different platform! Basically, I had accompanied him from the hostel for the sake of keeping him company. Before he boarded his train, we had engaged another porter to shift my luggage to the platform where my train was to arrive. He and I had carried some luggage so that only one porter would be required. But it so turned out that my train coach was to stop at a faraway point from where we had parked my luggage. So, I had no option but to ask yet another porter to carry my luggage from the original position to the appropriate spot on the platform - this time, just to transfer the luggage form one segment of the platform to another. Weirdly, there were no trolleys at the New Delhi railway station. I suspect, it could be because of the lobbying by porters' association as that would increase their earning. But that is besides the point. The third (and the last time) I had required porter's service, I was so exhausted (and also in pain), that how much I was paying was least of my concerns! It could be pointed out that I could have better planned the whole thing, and saved some odd hundred or so rupees, but again that is besides the point. The incident brought one thing to my attention. Whatever amount one pays the porter, it is basically less than what he 'deserves'. You might ask how?

My inference follows from one assumption, i.e., “no one likes to part with the money they have”. So, if you pay amount 'x' to the porter, you've the option of not giving that money. How? By carrying your luggage yourself. Carrying luggage is a very simple job – it does not require much specialized skill. Yes, if you are alone, then you might not be able to carry the luggage yourself, as you might have to make more than one round to carry all of it. But in most cases, people hire a porter's service because they are uncomfortable doing the job themselves. It is to avoid exhaustion and pain that carrying the luggage would cause. So, if despite having the option to carry the luggage yourself, and not lose the amount x in the process, that you agree to lose it only proves that you would have not carried that much luggage for someone else to earn amount x. Now just pause for a moment and think:

For what amount of money would you be ready to carry for someone else the same luggage that you ask the porter to carry?

I believe, some of the middle class/upper middle class or upper class persons would feel offended at being asked such a question. But that is not totally besides the point. Just kindly note the contempt some might feel for the job of carrying others' luggage or for the persons doing so, so much so that this question itself would lead to perceived offense. Anyway, returning to the point. For instance, on that day I had to pay up around Rs. 300 to the porters. Would I carry that much luggage as the porters did for me for someone else for Rs. 300? No, I will not. Yet, I felt the porters had charged me pretty steeply! Is that not weird? How much would I charge to carry that much luggage? I indeed thought about it. Not less than Rs. 2000!

My current income is stipendiary. In not very distant future, I would get to earn at least Rs. 2000 per day, doing almost totally sedentary work. Would I like to earn my livelihood the way those porters do? Definitely not. Would the porter like to earn his livelihood the way I would get to do? Almost certainly yes. Which means, the work he is doing is much more difficult than what I would be doing to earn, yet he earns significantly less than what I would. And as obvious corollary, I would earn much better than him despite doing a more pleasant and less painful job. Is something not strange about this equation?

Of course, it is not difficult to figure out that this situation has come about because relatively fewer people would have gained my kind of knowledge and training as compared to the bare minimum 'skills' required to carry heavy luggage. But at least in countries like India, do all people really get the opportunity, and subsequent choice of how to earn their livelihood? So though we do largely have free job market as far as influence that demand and supply exercise on amounts paid by people in return of services is concerned, but it has got highly monopolized. It has got monopolized because acquisition of those skills that enable earning relatively easily are beyond reach of the majority of population. The porters who had carried my luggage must have never got the opportunity to acquire those skills. Their children are unlikely to get opportunity to get the education to escape out of what has almost become a vicious cycle.

The realization of this inequity of opportunities is not new for me. Apart from movies, TV programs and short stories in textbooks that had sensitized me to these harsh realities, what had brought me face-to-face with them was my stay in a hostel during my graduation. There in the mess, as helps we used to have boys – some of them could have been below the age of 14 years (which would qualify as “child labour” in India, and is illegal). That it was illegal was the least of the problems with the situation. Those who are aware of the ground realities in India would appreciate that there is no infrastructure to support such children. Their parents are usually so poor that despite government (claiming to) provide free education and mid-day meal, etc., children who do not start working are seen as liabilities by parents. It is also possible that a few of them could be orphans.

A vast majority of students (the GenNext, if you may) were so comfortable with ordering them around. Scolding them for food badly prepared by the cook. Some of the angry students would not shy from using incestual expletives (“mother fucker”, e.g.). I am not saying, ”Haww, students were so indecent as to use 'bad words'”, but what had always shocked me was the comfort and the authority with which that contempt was held. The acceptance of master-slave relationship was mutual and apparent on both sides. The idea that one set of human beings were “first class”, and another set were “second class” was so strongly ingrained in the collective psyche that I used to find the environment nauseating. I am not a very intrusive person by nature. So I hardly said anything to anyone. Yet, to some of the closer friends, I used to point out if they were to get rude in terms of ”what is his fault”? Since they were close to me, my friends would apologize to me, and correct their behavior for some time. However, what I could invariably notice was that they would do so because they would feel their behavior had not been 'proper', or because they should be 'nice' to people. In other words, even the courtesy shown (upon prompting) was an outcome of self-serving narcissism. The very fundamental idea of egalitarianism never occurred to them. It never occurred to them that the people they were putting in a mental effort to be 'nice' with, were just as much humans as them, and that they had as much right as them to live, to breath the same air as them, to just be happy! Just because they were bringing food from the kitchen for them, and carrying their plates back after they would have finished their meal does not in any way push them to a lower stratum. The work they were doing was a service, for which they were being paid. Seeing those children, some of who were only a few years younger than me (I had entered the hostel at the age of 17), I used to remain in a state of perennial guilt:

As compared to them, what different have I done to deserve these opportunities in life? How are the ways of the world such that these children are seen as inferior beings as compared to me? What is their fault? How in the scheme of things of the world, they had become the lower stratum of the society, the secondary citizens? Whatever I am today or I will be in future, as compared to these kids, would always remain undeserved - however 'hard' I work towards it.

Somewhere down the line, I had happened to read Ayn Rand's (click) two novels - 'The Fountainhead' and 'Atlas shrugged'. I had become (and still am) quite impressed with the philosophy contained therein. But I realized two things about the main characters in the novels:

1. All of them might have had to struggle, but yet the society was never such that they would be deprived of basic education. Probably, the poorest of them all - Gail Waynand and Howard Roark (both found in The Fountainhead) had at least basic education [latter, in fact, had brought such circumstances upon himself that he was expelled from one of the better American architecture schools].

2. None of the major characters themselves had children. Only one of the somewhat prominent characters - Jed Starnes had children. He had died suddenly and hence had not had the opportunity to prepare his will (recalling from memory).

Despite the fact that Ayn Rand had spent her childhood in the erstwhile USSR, it seems she had not come across the kind of poverty and utter lack of opportunities to even study and gain knowledge to become 'employable' with some bargaining power - that are seen in India. The reason perhaps her characters did not have children was because she might have not wanted them to face the ethical dilemma of how much time, money and emotions to invest in the children in case they would not turn out to be with same value system as their own. The central theme of her novels, as far as I could make out was: to value people in proportion to their attributes that could be objectively adjudged as 'valuable'. Thus, children pose unique ethical predicament. On one hand parents owe them their nurture (investment of time, effort and emotions) because, children are never party to the decision of bringing them to life, i.e., children's consent as to whether they would like to live and risk being unhappy or in pain, is never sought, which makes it obligatory on parents to try to provide them with such resources that children do not regret their parents' unilateral (parents as one party) of bringing them to life. But on the other hand, objectivist philosophy would demand that one devote one's time, money and emotions in persons only in proportion to their worth as determined by their attributes. However, children either do not possess any pervasive attributes, or if those attributes make them disfavored candidates to receive nurture, then what to do? I can imagine, Rand's characters would bequeath their property and money, not to family members, but to some capable employee or colleague. But that is so unusual in our society! Perhaps to escape this dilemma Rand's major characters did not have any children! I have not read the other works of Ayn Rand, so it is possible she might have dealt with this issue elsewhere, though I find it hard to understand how she could have resolved such a complex problem (perhaps she did not have any child despite being married for over 50 years to the same person).

The reason I discussed the above concept was to explain, how the concept of inheritance is ethically flawed. And it is inheritance of parents' nurture (and the opportunities that come with it), affluence, social status, etc. that basically leads to monopolization of resources to acquire 'higher-order' skills that are required to gain greater bargaining skills in the employment market (education and vocational training). This concept of inheritance brings with it a strange condition, wherein, whether a person will die of hunger before turning five, or would struggle as a child laborer, or enjoy a middle class education and opportunities for 'upward mobility' through the social and economic strata, or would be born at the very top with the proverbial silver spoon in the mouth - are determined to a very great degree and in current Indian economic situation irreversibly so by just one factor - PURE CHANCE. In absolute terms, a child before even getting to commit any acts so as to display recognizable traits, which in turn would be required to determine 'what' the child deserves as a person ('good' v/s 'bad' things), becomes largely destined to one or the other social and economic stratum. All this happens without the humanity getting an opportunity to determine how 'deserving' the child is and of what!

The situation is so bad in India possibly because means to basic survival are much more difficult to acquire here than in the Western countries, which in turn, I feel are because of India's high fertility rate and population density.

Now, trying to apply all that I had inferred and speculated in this free-wheeling write up up till now, let us assume India's population density would have been less than what it is now:

1. The porter who carried my luggage would have had access to much better education. This because, the overall production of goods (needed for basic survival) would remain the same (most of the rural population currently is afflicted with high degree of disguised unemployment), but would be distributed among much fewer people. Hence, the porter's parents would not be worried about having their household income augmented by making their son work.

2. He might have become a teacher or a clerk or a doctor or an engineer.

3. There would have been much fewer porters at the New Delhi railway station.

4. Whoever would now be the porter at the railway station would have had much better bargaining power. Possibly, he would have earned more than Rs. 5000 a day instead of Rs. 500 that he currently might be earning.

5. His children would also get to study in schools and be at par with 'middle class' as far as opportunities for skill acquisition would be concerned.

6. Because there would be a paucity of porters, coupled with his good income, he would be respected.

Almost the same analysis as above could be applied to helps in the hostel mess. Likewise, those working at nuclear establishments would be able to realistically demand a higher pay for risking their lives and health.

Those who manage to read this post till the end might be wondering, what is the big deal?! Meaning, everyone knows that India's large population (density) is a liability. Apart from delineating the inferences I could draw from mundane experiences, and discussing broadly their ramifications in the field of ethics (something that we understand intuitively, but never get into the details of), one of the goals was to show how India's large population density is has implications in areas as seemingly unrelated as nature of interpersonal relationships. It is not difficult to understand that with such acute differences in rights and opportunities that arise with economic disparities, friction amongst various classes is imminent. The incentive to move to the higher strata is much stronger. The idea of social hierarchy is so very deeply ingrained in our collective psyche that we never realize that it represents something very wrong! E.g., an educated (and higher earning) boss would be entitled to humiliate a comparably educated subordinate only because we love hierarchies! So, likewise the disincentive to stay in one's socioeconomic strata is also very strong. No wonder, the worst target of these prevailing factors is ethics. Everything becomes fair in love and war. And everything becomes love and war. Upward mobilization is what counts.

To summarize:

1. Less desirable jobs should be high paying.

2. India's overwhelming population density and accompanying poverty and paucity of material resources leads children into child labor. This pushes basic education and skill acquisition beyond reach of many children.

3. These children even after growing up remain poor bargainers when it comes to compensation for the extremely physically challenging and monotonous work they do (despite the fact that I proved above that they automatically deserve much more than what they get - from the porter's example).

4. People with only very basic skills are held in contempt because of their poverty and abundance of such persons. As a consequence, sharp socioeconomic stratification emerges.

5. The sharpness of this stratification leads to abandoning of ethicality in one conducts in favor of practices that can earn one money. E.g., this leads to ills like nepotism, corruption and other crimes.

6. Children of deprived parents enter the same cycle as above and produce more children, who in turn enter the same cycle.

7. This cycle can be broken! Not so much by providing more universal schooling, but by decreasing the population density, for which fertility rates will have to come down, for which in turn better education and awareness need to be created! Ah, so it might not be that easy to break the cycle, after all.

My pessimism in this regard had been broken only once by Atanu Dey in his blog post - There’s only so Much that Needs to Get Done (click).

A small note: Given India's energy crisis, I find nuclear energy a very good means of energy production. I find the fears instilled by some environmental pressure groups to be exaggerated greatly. The solution lies not in shunning nuclear energy as an option altogether, but to improve the levels of professionalism across the populations and vocations. Directly or indirectly the high cost of energy (whether required to run automobiles and locomotives or to light our houses) is a strong contributing factor to India's being behind in manufacturing sector, and also for high inflation. Latter further perpetuates the vicious cycle of poverty.

Possible conflict of interest: Area of my work is going to involve nuclear technology. But which also means, I am better aware of the risks posed by radiation exposure vis-a-vis other losses that not using this technology would entail.

The Truth behind the Rhyme

Jack and Jill went up the hill
To fetch a pail of water.

Jack fell down and broke his crown,
On pushing, Jill couldn't control her laughter.

Survival of the Fittest - a Counterintuitive Example and Evolution of Man

Charles Darwin (click) had put forth the theory of natural selection (click), which has been defined by Wikipedia as follows:

Natural selection is the process by which certain heritable traits - those that make it more likely for an organism to survive and successfully reproduce - become more common in a population over successive generations.

Natural selection is frequently referred to as "survival of the fittest" for sake of simplicity.

Let me give a hypothetical example. There are two varieties of moths in a population - A and B. A flies faster and has a better sense of smell; B is slower and cannot smell as well. The moths feed on flower nectar for survival. Also, they are equally likely to successfully reproduce. These two varieties live in an area where there is a scarcity of flowers. Let this flower be called the O variety. Common sense would suggest that A should be able to get to flowers faster - both because of better sense of smell and faster flying. Thus, fewer of the B variety would be able to survive, and gradually their numbers would decrease. There would come a time when the ratio of both the varieties in the population would stabilize in the region. This because, despite A's ability to reach the flowers faster, pure chance would allow the B variety to also feed on few flowers. Moreover, B-moth has to mate only once to pass down its genes even if it dies of starvation.

Now imagine, someone introduces a new plant (N variety) in the region such that its flower produces a very strong fragrance. The problem with this plant is, it is insectivorous (click), i.e., its flower traps and digests (kills) insects to fulfill its protein requirements. Now obviously, A-moths would reach the N-flowers faster and die. Gradually, the ratio of A:B moths would decrease. Whether B-moths outnumber the A-moths would depend on the relative strengths of fragrances of the O- and N-flowers. If the N-flower has stronger fragrance, then most of the A-moths would get attracted to it and die without reproducing. The situation for B-moths would be more complex. Whether their absolute numbers decrease significantly or not would depend on the number of N-flowers available. Meaning, if N-flowers are themselves not very successful in surviving, then they would only be able to decrease the number of A-moths, which would leave B-moths free to feed on O-flowers and mate gaily (with moth of the opposite sex, of course!). But if N-flowers increase significantly in number, the entire moth population might get eliminated from the region.

The important thing I wanted to illustrate was when talking of fittest in the sense of survival, the said traits need not be what we ordinarily think of as good (e.g., better sense of smell and faster speed of flying). Those traits must help the individual organisms survive and reproduce as well. So as part of evolution, species on the whole do not 'improve', but become better suited for the environment.

Human species has come a long way from having to struggle for basic survival. 'Success' in many societies is not even linked to ability to reproduce. Ability to attract a suitable mate does not necessarily transform into passing down of genes, thanks to contraception and family planning. Many inheritable diseases may manifest after the affected individual reproduces. With possibility of cloning in the future, even those unable to reproduce conventionally may be able to pass on their genes.

All these factors have made a few people concerned that the 'quality' of human beings would worsen. But there is inherent paradox in this idea. 'Quality' of human beings has nothing to do with human conceptions of desirable or undesirable traits. From perspective of natural selection, fit v/s unfit had always been about ability to pass on ones genes.

So will the human species stop evolving?

This question cannot be answered in simplistic terms. Unfortunately, because of being exposed to pictures that show evolution of species in a linear fashion with various stages (e.g. tree-dwelling lemurs getting transformed into upright walking humans), we have come to believe that evolution is all about gross physical changes. But then many changes could be subtle and not manifest physically. What allows new traits to emerge in a population are gene mutations (click), i.e., an inheritable change in an existing trait or appearance of a new one. So in case of humans, though new mutations would keep on emerging, they are unlikely to displace people of pre-existing traits, because, they will not necessarily make them reproduce at faster rate.

Surging ahead in time, when societal pressures to reproduce to continue the family would diminish, factors like inherent attraction to children and nurturing behavior, both of which are enhanced by a hormone called oxytocin (click) could become important. Thus in future, not necessarily physically stronger or better looking or more intelligent people, but those with higher oxytocin levels and desire to rear children would be evolutionarily more "successful"! Of course, all this is merely my conjecture.